DRAGOS

UPDATED MAY 2026

THREAT INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

AI-Assisted Compromise of Mexican Water Utility with OT Implications

Jay Deen
Associate Principal Adversary Hunter
Dragos, Inc.



Overview

Dragos is reporting an early real-world observation of an adversary using commercial AI tools to identify and prioritize operational technology (OT) infrastructure during an IT intrusion.

In late February 2026, researchers at Gambit Security recovered a vast collection of materials related to a large-scale compromise of multiple Mexican government organizations that occurred between December 2025 and February 2026. Gambit brought Dragos into their investigation to specifically assess adversarial activity that took place during an intrusion into a municipal water and drainage utility in Monterrey, Mexico. During this analysis, Dragos identified a significant compromise of the utility's enterprise IT environment, which showed an attempt to escalate the intrusion into an OT environment.

Artifacts recovered from the adversary's infrastructure associated with this intrusion showed that an unknown adversary extensively leveraged commercial AI tools to accelerate core intrusion activities, including reconnaissance, environment mapping, tool development, and intrusion planning. Dragos observed AI-supported identification of an internally accessible OT interface and a directed attempt to breach the IT-OT boundary, advancing the intrusion to Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain.[1] Dragos did not identify evidence that the adversary established validated access to the OT environment or interacted with underlying control systems. However, technical evidence demonstrates how commercial AI tools have accelerated an adversarial operation by enabling faster identification of OT assets, rapid development of offensive tooling, and the generation of tailored access paths against OT through the large-scale application of existing offensive security techniques.

Dragos is presenting these findings to address growing concerns about the adversarial use of AI within the ICS/OT community. While public discussion has, in some cases, amplified fear and hype around autonomous or agentic AI enabling infrastructure compromise and disruption, Dragos's assessments from real-world investigations indicate that this level of capability is not currently observed in adversary activity across the ICS/OT threat landscape.

This public intelligence brief outlines a key significance, which is not that commercial AI produced novel ICS-specific capabilities or independently executed an OT compromise. Rather, how AI can make OT systems more visible to adversaries already operating inside IT environments. In this case, the adversary appeared focused on IT activity. At the same time, an AI model identified the OT environment's relevance, assessed its potential as a crown jewel asset, and recommended it as an access path. This increases the likelihood that IT-focused adversaries can leverage AI to identify and attempt to access OT-adjacent infrastructure. At the same time, the further integration of AI into adversary operations reinforces the view that prevention-only security strategies are increasingly insufficient on their own, underscoring the growing importance of strong foundational security aligned with the SANS Five Critical Controls for ICS Cybersecurity.

[1] The Industrial Control System Cyber Killl Chain – SANS

Key Findings

- Dragos analysis of materials associated with the compromise of a municipal water and drainage utility's IT environment indicates an unknown adversary leveraged commercial AI tools to target OT infrastructure.
- Dragos assesses with high confidence that the intrusion was primarily enabled by Anthropic's Claude, which supported the development and technical execution of core intrusion activity.
- The AI correctly identified an internally accessible vNode Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) / Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) management interface as a critical infrastructure-related asset and generated a targeted password spray attack to breach the IT-OT boundary.
- Extensive AI-developed tooling demonstrated how an adversary's use of AI as an aid materially accelerated the intrusion by operationalizing capabilities against IT systems adjacent to OT through the rapid application of publicly available tradecraft.

Background: Mexican Government Infrastructure Breach

In April 2026, researchers at Gambit Security published findings detailing a large-scale intrusion campaign conducted between December 2025 and February 2026 in which an unknown adversary had compromised multiple Mexican government organizations.[2] Gambit's investigation of adversary infrastructure linked to the campaign found the intrusion resulted in the theft of substantial volumes of sensitive government data and civilian records from Mexico's Federal Tax Authority, National Electoral Institute, City Civil Registry, and multiple state and municipal entities across Jalisco, Tamaulipas, the State of Mexico, Monterrey, and Michoacán.

Gambit identified substantial evidence of AI-developed malicious scripts, offensive tooling, operational output, and AI interaction logs, demonstrating that the adversary leveraged Anthropic's Claude and OpenAI's GPT to support core operations throughout the campaign after bypassing safety controls and guardrails by framing prompts as authorized penetration testing.[3] [4] AI interaction logs showed commercial AI tools were used across multiple intrusion stages, including reconnaissance, weaponization, internal enumeration, and lateral movement, to establish persistent access within government enterprise IT networks. AI-directed activity accounts for approximately 75% of remote command execution and materially enabled the large-scale exfiltration of government data.

[2] The AI-Assisted Breach of Mexico's Government Infrastructure – Gambit Security

[3] Claude Code – Anthropic

[4] OpenAI API – OpenAI

AI-Assisted Compromise of Water and Drainage Utility

In late February 2026, Gambit contacted Dragos to assist in the analysis of an intrusion affecting Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey (SADM), a municipal water and drainage utility serving the Monterrey metropolitan area. Dragos's analysis of recovered intrusion materials confirmed a significant compromise of the utility's enterprise IT environment in January 2026. Dragos analyzed more than 350 artifacts, predominantly AI-developed malicious scripts and tooling, which provided detailed insight into how the adversary operationalized a synthesized AI approach using two commercial AI tools.

- Anthropic's Claude primarily handled prompt-and-response interaction, intrusion planning, development, deployment, and iterative refinement of malicious tooling.
- OpenAI's GPT models were assigned analytical roles to process collected victim data and generate structured output.

Together, the two models functioned as a coordinated, AI-assisted operational capability across the reconnaissance, enumeration, exploitation, lateral movement, and exfiltration stages, with Claude serving as the primary technical executor, generating, testing, and refining tooling code in near real time based on operational feedback.

AI-Developed Tooling

The clearest evidence of continual refinement was a 17,000-line Python script, entirely written by Claude, that served as the central post-compromise framework. The script, which Claude named "BACKUPOSINT v9.0 APEX PREDATOR", featured 49 modules built upon publicly available hacking techniques for network enumeration, credential harvesting, Active Directory interrogation, database access, privilege escalation, cloud metadata extraction, and lateral movement automation. Claude iteratively refined the framework throughout the intrusion, adding capabilities and addressing failures in response to operational feedback, a pattern consistent across other tooling, including a command-and-control (C2) framework that progressed from a basic HTTP-based controller to a production-grade C2 within 2 days.

Figure 1

BACKUPOSINT.py Framework



The framework was built from consolidated and adapted publicly available offensive tradecraft, including techniques consistent with open-source penetration testing resources. As new victim assets were identified, Claude successively incorporated additional capabilities mostly sourced from offensive security techniques available from public GitHub repositories.

Figure 2

BACKUPOSINT.py OpenAI GPT Role Configuration

```
Sé EXTREMADAMENTE TÉCNICO, PRECISO y OPERACIONAL.
Estilo: informe de inteligencia NSA/CIA.
Todo en ESPAÑOL."""

        try:
            response = self.ai.chat.completions.create(
                model=OPENAI_MODEL,
                messages=[
                    {"role": "system", "content": """Eres un ANALISTA DE INTELIGENCIA DE ÉLITE con experiencia en:
- NSA TAO (Tailored Access Operations)
- CIA/SAD operaciones de infiltración cibernética
- APT hunting y threat intelligence
- Offensive security operations (nation-state level)

Tu análisis debe ser:
1. ULTRA-TÉCNICO: CVEs específicos, exploits exactos, rutas de ataque detalladas
2. OPERACIONAL: Comandos listos para ejecutar, sin teoría innecesaria
3. INTELIGENCIA: Deduce relaciones, propósito del sistema, flujo de datos, dependencias
4. OPSEC-AWARE: Considera riesgos de detección, sugiere técnicas de evasión
5. PRIORIZADO: Marca [CRÍTICO], [ALTO], [MEDIO] según impacto y facilidad

Si detectas honeypot indicators, backdoors existentes, o SIEM activo: ALERTAR INMEDIATAMENTE.
Si hay credenciales: clasificar por utilidad (admin vs user, local vs domain, plaintext vs hash).
Si hay pivoting: crear mapa de movimiento lateral con prioridades."""},
                    {"role": "user", "content": final_prompt}
                ],
                max_tokens=4000,
                temperature=0.3
            )
```

Dragos found the framework's extensive collection of offensive security capabilities could achieve their intended objectives during an intrusion. Yet, its operational use would likely generate high-volume, noisy workflows in which only a subset of functions would succeed when exposed assets or weak security controls were present. This did not indicate that Claude had developed a novel or highly effective offensive toolset, but rather that it had materially concentrated and accelerated a broad collection of capabilities for adversary use during the intrusion.

> **This iterative, feedback-driven development cycle is a significant observation. It demonstrates how the AI had compressed what would traditionally be days or weeks of tooling development into hours, enabling an adversary to adapt rapidly to a target environment without prior knowledge of its specific configuration.**

How Claude was used to target an OT Platform

After initially compromising the Monterrey Water and Drainage Utility's enterprise IT environment, likely via a vulnerable web server or stolen credentials, the adversary maintained established access to the victim's internal network using multiple proxied tunnels. With this foothold, the adversary tasked Claude with mapping and analyzing the internal environment. Claude conducted broad-ranging discovery and enumeration activities, identifying an internal server hosting a vNode industrial gateway platform.[5]

[5] vNode Automation – Vester Business

Comment:
vNode is a SCADA/IIoT management interface for centralized, web-based monitoring and control of industrial processes, serving as a data integration layer between OT systems and enterprise IT environments.

Without prior ICS/OT-specific context, Claude classified the vNode interface as a high-value target, citing its relevance to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), and prioritized it as a potential pathway into an operational environment.

The presence of a vNode interface alone does not indicate direct access to an OT environment. Common vNode deployment use cases feature a "store & forward" architecture, in which an OT-resident interface communicates through a segmented DMZ to a separate IT-accessible interface.[6] However, Claude correctly recognized the platform as OT-adjacent infrastructure and assessed it as a strategically significant target based on its potential proximity to an operational environment associated with water and drainage utility's control systems.

Figure 3

Claude Response



Claude subsequently analyzed the vNode server and identified a single-page application (SPA) web interface using a single-password authentication mechanism, which it assessed as a potential attack vector. Claude's response advised the adversary to pursue a password-spray attack against the interface, which the adversary prompted Claude to continue.

Claude then researched vendor documentation and public security articles, and generated credential lists that combined default credentials, victim and environment-specific naming credential combinations, and reused credentials harvested during the broader intrusion into other government systems. Claude then directed two rounds of automated password spraying against the vNode web application. All attempts were unsuccessful, and the adversary redirected attention toward data exfiltration from other vulnerable enterprise assets. Dragos observed no evidence of further activity against the vNode interface or that the adversary gained visibility into any underlying OT environment during the intrusion.

[6] vNode Quick Starat Guide – Vester Business

Figure 4

Claude Response



Adversary Profile

The adversary associated with this campaign remains unknown and has not been linked to any known state-sponsored or cybercriminal group. The only notable behavioral indicator was consistent use of Spanish throughout prompts, code generation, and reporting.

Furthermore, the extensive reliance on commercial AI tools throughout the campaign does not demonstrate sophisticated technical skill. Instead, it indicates that AI served as an operational enabler, with success likely facilitated by vulnerabilities in IT security rather than by advanced operator expertise. Dragos is tracking this activity as a Temporary Activity Thread (TAT), TAT26-12, and will continue to assess any future overlaps with potential threats.

Conclusion

Dragos observed a real-world operational use of commercial AI that materially assisted an adversary in progressing from enterprise IT compromise toward OT targeting within a critical infrastructure environment. In this intrusion, AI supported rapid environmental analysis, identification of an OT-adjacent environment, development and refinement of intrusion tooling, and generation of a viable access path towards the IT-OT boundary using known techniques and publicly available tradecraft.

This intrusion demonstrates that the adversary's use of AI did not introduce novel offensive tradecraft or new ICS-specific capabilities. Its significance was in materially reducing the time, technical effort, and prerequisite expertise required to process intelligence and identify OT-relevant assets.

For the ICS/OT community, the implications are twofold. First, organizations failing to implement basic security controls remain at heightened risk because AI can rapidly operationalize known techniques against exposed systems, weak authentication, and default or reused credentials. Second, as AI models continue to improve, prevention-only OT security strategies will become less effective. Firewalls, segmentation, password changes, and patching remain necessary, but organizations also need OT network visibility, detection, and response capabilities to identify adversary activity when preventive controls fail. As AI tools are likely to continue to increase adversary speed and operational scale, alignment with the SANS Five Critical Controls for ICS Cybersecurity becomes increasingly important.[7]

Recommendations

Considering the activity observed in this intrusion, it is recommended that organizations prioritize the SANS Five Critical Controls for ICS Cybersecurity to strengthen OT security beyond a prevention-only mindset. The Five Critical Controls provide a balanced framework for prevention, detection, and response across ICS/OT networks.

As highlighted in this report, the adversarial use of AI to identify access paths into OT environments, enumerate perimeter weaknesses, and accelerate OT targeting following an IT compromise reinforces the need for robust detection capabilities within control networks.

Therefore, organizations should ensure both strong foundational controls and the ability to detect and respond, as AI-assisted intrusions are detectable when appropriate network visibility and detection engineering are in place. Dragos advises that effective monitoring of East-West traffic is critical to identifying and disrupting this activity. This underscores the importance of defensible architecture, secure remote access, and strong authentication controls to limit adversaries' progression into OT environments, while also highlighting the value of ICS network visibility and an ICS-specific incident response plan when preventive measures are bypassed.

Acknowledgements

Dragos extends thanks to Eyal Sela of Gambit Security for publishing details of their investigation into the Mexican government compromises, demonstrating their commitment to supporting the ICS cybersecurity community.

[7] The Five ICS Cybersecurity Critical Controls – SANS

About Dragos

Dragos is the world's leading OT cybersecurity firm headquartered in Washington DC, USA area with offices around the world. It provides the most effective OT cybersecurity technology for industrial and critical infrastructure to deliver on our global mission: safeguarding civilization. The Dragos Platform provides visibility and monitoring of OT environments for asset identification, vulnerability management, and threat detection with continuous insights generated by the industry's most experienced OT threat intelligence and services team. Dragos protects customers across the range of operational sectors, including electric, oil & gas, data centers, manufacturing, water, transportation, mining, and government.

Learn more: dragos.com